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A Comparative Analysis of the Accuracy and Uncertainty in 
Real Estate and Macroeconomic Forecasts 
 
Abstract 
We compare and contrast the accuracy and uncertainty in forecasts of rents with those 
for a variety of macroeconomic series. The results show that in general forecasters tend to be 
marginally more accurate in the case of macro-economic series than with rents. In common 
across all of the series, forecasts tend to be smoothed with forecasters under-estimating 
performance during economic booms, and vice-versa in recessions We find that property 
forecasts are affected by economic uncertainty, as measured by disagreement across the 
macro-forecasters. Increased uncertainty leads to increased dispersion in the rental forecasts 
and a reduction in forecast accuracy.  
 
 
 
 
  
A Comparative Analysis of the Accuracy and 
Uncertainty in Real Estate and Macroeconomic Forecasts 
 
1: Introduction 
The importance of the macro-economy on real estate markets cannot be understated. 
Its nature as a real, as well as investment asset means that real estate is very directly 
influenced by overall economic conditions and performance. The direct link via the demand 
for the asset from an occupier perspective means that measures of economic performance are 
key drivers of real estate, in particular rents. This is clearly illustrated by the extensive use of 
macro-economic variables in both industry and academic econometric models of rental 
markets
i
. The use of macro-economic data is especially important in a forecasting context
ii
. 
These close linkages provide the motivation and the points of interest for this paper. Using 
professional forecast data for both rents and a variety of macro-economic variables for the 
U.K. we compare the accuracy of the series’. Whilst a large literature has considered the 
accuracy of macro-economic series (e.g. Batchelor & Dua, 1991; Zarnowitz & Braun 1993; 
Laster et al. 1999; Oller & Barrot, 2000; Loungani 2001; Batchelor 2007; Boero et al. 2008; 
Campbell & Sharpe 2009), a relatively small number of papers have considered the accuracy 
of real estate forecasters (e.g. Ling, 2005; McAllister et al., 2008; Matysiak et al., 2012). We 
expand upon this literature to explicit compare and contrast the accuracy and uncertainty in 
both rental and macro-economic forecasts, allowing us to consider whether real estate 
forecasters share common characteristics with their counterparts in economics.  
The second element of the empirical analysis extends upon the preceding to consider 
more explicitly the interlinkages between the two sets of variables. Given the use of forecasts 
of macro-economic variables in econometric models of real estate, how do the economic 
forecasts impact upon those of rents ? We consider a number of aspects in this respect 
including the impact on the accuracy in property forecasts in a causal sense. However, we can 
also consider whether increased uncertainty, as measured by increased disagreement across 
the macro-economic forecasters, also affects the accuracy and uncertainty in property 
forecasts. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
pertinent literature. Section 3 provides details concerning the data analysed in this study. The 
following two sections contain the main empirical results. Section 6 provides concluding 
remarks.  
 2: Literature 
Amongst the large forecasting accuracy literature only a relatively small number of 
papers have explicitly and in depth considered however inaccuracy and/or uncertainty in one 
set of forecasts potentially impacts upon another. The majority of papers have focused on 
either empirical tests of forecast accuracy or considered those factors and circumstances that 
may help to explain and contribute to differences in forecast accuracy. Hendry & Clements 
(2003) and Stekler (2007) note several possible reasons that may contribute to reduced 
forecast accuracy, including: model mis-specification, the use of inaccurate data, the 
characteristics of the individual forecasters and the presence of structural breaks that may 
affect the deterministic trend. It is of particular interest in the context of the current paper that 
they highlight the importance of data, as indeed do Oller & Barot (2000). One of the key 
propositions underlying our empirical analysis is to consider whether heightened inaccuracy 
and uncertainty in the macro-economic forecasts has a corresponding impact upon the 
property forecasts.   
In addition to the above elements it is also important to note how behavioural issues 
surrounding the individual forecasts may affect accuracy. Fintzen & Stekler (1999) note that 
the manner in which forecasts are prepared may affect their accuracy, whilst Gjaltema (2001) 
argues that forecast outcomes may be influenced by the distinct and individual characteristics 
of the forecasters. Furthermore, a number of studies have noted how factors such as forecaster 
reputation may lead to forecasters not solely concentrating on accuracy and thus deliberately 
biasing their forecasts (Ehrebeck & Waldman, 1996; Laster et al., 1999; Pons-Novell, 2003)
iii
. 
Batchelor (2007) argues that there are three key reasons as to why forecasters may 
persistently produce forecasts that are biased. The first relates to a lack of appropriate skills 
and a corresponding inability to efficiently incorporate new information. Forecasters may also 
fail to learn from past forecast errors, thus produce biased forecasts on an ongoing basis. The 
second reason is that forecasters may fail to differentiate between permanent and transitory 
changes in the target variable. Finally, financial or reputational incentives may lead to overly 
optimistic or pessimistic forecasts.  
Generally the importance of judgemental overlays is a key issue in the resulting 
accuracy of forecasts. As we are dealing with a dynamic process, forecasters have to use their 
judgment during the entire process. A wide array of papers has highlighted the importance of 
judgmental adjustments on the predictive accuracy of econometric models (e.g. McNees, 
1990; Donihue, 1993). There is empirical evidence (e.g. Lahiri & Sheng, 2010a) illustrating 
how individual judgment can contribute to forecast uncertainty and in turn accuracy. 
Batchelor (2007), over the sample period 1990 to 2005, documented the presence of 
systematic bias in real GDP, and to a lesser extent in inflation forecasts in some of the G7 
economies. Specifically, he found that when GDP had been falling in Japan, Italy, Germany 
and France, forecasters tended to smooth their forecasts. The result being an upward bias, 
with overly optimistic predictions of economic performance. In contrast in the remaining 
countries (Canada, U.K. and U.S.) where GDP did not fall, the same bias was not observed. A 
similar result was also noted by Ager et al. (2009) specifically with respect to Germany and 
Italy. More generally Jonung & Larch (2006) find that over-optimism is a distinctive feature 
in macroeconomic forecasts for European countries such as Italy and France, though not in 
the UK. In addition, papers such as Zarnowitz & Braun (1993) also support the finding that 
there is a tendency to overestimate growth rates when the market underperforms and vice-
versa.  
Lahiri & Sheng (2010b), in their examination of the G7, report evidence that indicates 
that inflation forecasts are more accurate in comparison with those for GDP. They find that in 
comparison with GDP, inflation forecasters: i) produce more accurate forecasts with smaller 
forecast errors), ii) disagree to a lesser extent and iii) revise their forecasts much earlier in 
comparison with those for real GDP forecasts. Consistent with these findings is the study of 
Dovern & Weisser (2011) who examined rationality (i.e. the level of bias and efficiency) in a 
variety of macroeconomic forecasts for the G7 countries. They find that individual forecasters 
who accurately predict real GDP growth are also likely to perform well in forecasting other 
macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, consistent with previously cited work, they tend to 
smooth GDP forecasts. In contrast, the forecasts of inflation are unbiased.  
In contrast to the large number of papers to have considered the performance of 
macro-economic forecasters, the number to have examined the issue in the context of real 
estate is limited. This is despite real estate sharing many of the same behavioural 
characteristics with macro-economic series, and certainly more in comparison to equities. In 
particular, real estate data has long been recognized to display smoothing, a characteristic 
which contributes to reduced volatility in comparison with exchange traded assets such as 
stocks. The nature of the forecasting process also differs with an increased emphasis on 
overall market conditions and trends in contrast to estimates of individual company 
performance. Therefore, in many respects a greater parallel exists with the forecasting 
literature to have considered the accuracy of macro-economic series rather than the literature 
concerning stocks.  
The real estate forecasting literature can be broadly sub-divided into two. The first 
group of papers is those to have explicitly forecast the asset or to have compared the 
performance of different forecasting approaches. The second group is that which has 
specifically considered the performance of professional-published forecasts, a literature that is 
extremely limited. The majority of this literature has considered the same U.K. data as 
analysed in the current paper. The McAllister et al. (2008) paper reveals a number of 
interesting elements, specifically evidence that herding is a common characteristic. The paper 
is however constrained by only being able to consider data up until 2004. It therefore misses 
both the extreme positive market conditions through 2005-6 and the subsequent market 
correction in 2007-8.  
By examining data through to 2011 Matysiak et al. (2012) are able to consider the 
issues at hand during the extreme market movements observed during the last cycle. 
Consistent with the previously discussed evidence from macro-economic series’, the property 
results illustrate that forecasters display a tendency to under-estimate growth rates during 
strong market conditions and over-estimate when the market is performing poorly. This 
conservatism not only results in smoothed estimates but also implies that forecasters display 
herding behaviour. There is also a marked difference in the relative accuracy of capital and 
total returns versus rental figures. Whilst rental growth forecasts are relatively accurate, 
considerable inaccuracy is observed with respect to capital value and total returns. The 
authors present a number of possible reasons as to this heightened inaccuracy including; i) a 
failure to fully capture the impact of low yields and the non-linearity of the yield-capital value 
relationship; ii) increased difficulty in accounting for investor behaviour in capital values; iii) 
bias resulting from a confusion of modelling fundamental values rather than actual market 
conditions irrespective of any perceived irrationalities felt to be present. In addition, the 
authors also note that the findings may also indicate that forecasters in real estate may simply 
be better at predicting rents due to enhanced awareness and expertise in the behaviour of 
underlying occupational market fundamentals. The poor forecasting ability displayed when 
total returns are considered is also noted in the Bond & Mitchell (2011) paper. They compare 
the accuracy of the IPF (Investment Property Forum) Consensus Forecast for total returns 
versus implied forecasts derived from total return swap contracts. The results, interestingly, 
show that for a one-year horizon, the derivatives based implied forecasts display greater 
accuracy than the published consensus forecasts for total returns. Ling (2005) is one of the 
only papers to have considered non-U.K. data. The results based on forecasts provided by the 
Real Estate Research Corporation (RERC) for the U.S. commercial market, indicate that 
consensus forecasts are backward looking and reveal little information in terms of subsequent 
performance. 
 
3: Data 
The data used in this study is provided by the Investment Property Forum (IPF), a UK 
based industry body, whilst the macro-economic forecasts are obtained from Consensus 
Economics. We analyse one-year forecasts from 1999 (for 2000) through to 2010 (for 2011). 
The sample period is determined by the availability of the property forecasts. Since 1999 the 
IPF has collected professional forecasts of the U.K. commercial property market from a 
variety of fund managements, financial institutions and property service and research firms. 
The reference points specified by the IPF are the returns for the ‘All Property’ annual indices 
for rents, capital values and total returns produced by IPD (Investment Property Databank). 
For the purposes of this analysis we solely consider the rental growth forecasts. The reason 
for this is two-fold. Firstly, both McAllister et al. (2008) and Matysiak et al. (2012) provide a 
comparative analysis of the relative accuracy of the three series. As noted previously, it is 
evident, especially in the Matysiak et al. (2012) piece that forecast accuracy significantly 
differs when capital and total returns are considered. Secondly, the importance of macro-
economic forecasts is more direct and relevant in the context of rents. The importance of 
economic conditions is heightened when the occupier market is considered. The total number 
of forecasters that have contributed to the IPF dataset is 69, comprising of 22 property 
advisors, 26 fund managers and 21 other financial institutions. The U.K. macro-economic 
data used is obtained from the Consensus Economics forecasting service and are the one-
year-ahead forecasts for GDP, Consumer Spending, Inflation (RPI), and the Unemployment 
Rate. Consensus Economics obtain the data from a variety of organisations including banks, 
consultancy firms, research institutes, corporations, and universities. In total 70 organisations 
have contributed to the dataset over this period.  
The descriptive analysis for both the property and macroeconomic forecasts is 
conducted on the entire sample. In order to assess the accuracy of the forecasts, we use the 
following measures: the Mean Absolute Error (MAE), the Mean Squared Error (MSE), and 
the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE), all of which are commonly used in the forecast 
accuracy literature (e.g. McNees, 1986; Makridakis et. al., 1998; Clements et al., 2007; 
Lenten, 2012). In each case the smaller the value, the higher the degree of accuracy. The 
MAE can be defined as:  
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where, e is the forecast error that is the difference between the actual and the forecast 
value,         ; and n is the number of the forecasting periods. The MAE measure 
therefore avoids offsetting effects from large positive and negative errors. The MSE 
overcomes the same issue by squaring the forecast error rather than taking the absolute error. 
In addition, by taking the square of the forecast error, this measure more heavily penalizes the 
forecasts with large errors.  
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The final measure is the RMSE that is the square root of the MSE, thereby returning it 
to the same unit of measurement. The RMSE can be displayed as follows: 
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4: Measures of Forecast Accuracy 
4.1: Preliminary Forecast Performance Measures 
Table 1 displays the primary summary statistics for the five different one year 
forecasts. The table reports both the actual and simple average consensus forecast together 
with statistics concerning the range and dispersion of the individual forecasts. To complement 
this data Figure 1 graphically illustrates the overall performance of the series in question and 
the respective consensus forecast. A number of elements are clearly evident from this initial 
examination. Firstly, it is apparent that in each case, both property and macro-economic 
forecasters have a tendency to underestimate the series in question during outperforming 
periods. Secondly, the forecasts tend to be smoothed when the volatility of the series’ are 
compared with the time-series behaviour of the actual outcome. 
With respect to the first point it can be seen that rental growth was consistently 
underestimated during the 2004-7 period which saw sustained strong percentage increases in 
the IPD rental index. Indeed, across the entire sample only in 2001 do we observe 
overestimation of rental growth in strong market conditions when the consensus was 4.50% 
in contrast to the achieved percentage change of 3.60%. This tendency for under-estimation is 
also observed with three of the macro-economic series, namely GDP, Consumer Spending 
and inflation. For GDP and Inflation there is likewise only one year when positive percentage 
change in the actual series’ was overestimated by the consensus, 2005 for GDP and 2002 for 
Inflation. In the case of Consumer Spending both 2005 and 2006 were exceptions. The 
unemployment rate series is slightly different, primarily due to the difference in its 
composition in that a high figure actual depicts worse rather than better economic conditions. 
However, the tendency to underestimate and be conservative on positive conditions, in this 
case lower unemployment, is also evident. Up until 2008, in only 2005 is the consensus 
forecast of the U.K’s unemployment rate lower than that which was achieved.  
This conservatism in forecasts, and the avoidance of big or bold forecasts, can be 
considered in the context of the behavioural considerations discussed earlier in the paper. 
Scotese (1994) argues that forecasters seek to avoid sudden and large adjustments in order to 
try and maintain their reputation and credibility. In the specific context of strong conditions 
an additional factor that may play a role in the provision of conservative forecasts is that the 
forecast error will be positive. Therefore, the ‘better than expected’ eventuality has a positive 
impact on sentiment about economic conditions and the forecast error associated is lost in the 
optimistic message. However, this conservatism is not only evidence during periods of strong 
economic performance. Studies such as Zarnowitz & Braun (1993) have noted how 
forecasters can have a tendency to make systematic errors, overestimating during downturns 
and underestimating during periods of economic growth. This over-estimation and positive 
bias of growth in poor conditions was also observed in 2008 and 2009 and the worsening 
economic conditions following and associated with the financial crisis. Across the different 
series the impact of the financial crisis and the economic contraction that followed was 
underestimated, the recovery observed in 2010 in many of the series, was not picked up.  
This conservatism results in the forecasts being smoothed, an impact that be can be 
illustrated if one compares the time-series standard deviations of the consensus forecast with 
the actual results. As reported in Table 1, for all of the series, with the exception of the 
Unemployment Rate, the volatility of the actual series is greater, and in some cases 
substantially so, than that of the respective consensus forecast. For example, with respect to 
the rental data, the standard deviation of the consensus forecast is 3.40% in comparison 
3.82% for the actual IPD index. For GDP the difference is more marked, 0.99% (consensus) 
in comparison to 2.33% (actual). It is interesting that the difference, and therefore the degree 
of smoothing, is smaller with the rental series than with GDP, Consumer Spending or 
Inflation
iv
.  
The avoidance of large numbers and the resulting forecast smoothing also implies that 
forecasters prefer being close to the consensus (Scotese, 1994; Batchelor & Dua, 1991). This 
literature implies that forecasters are not only conservative in order to be closer to the 
consensus but that, more generally, they revise their estimates by less than warranted by new 
information. Table 1 provides information concerning the range and dispersion of the 
individual forecasts. With the exception of the Unemployment Rate, when in only three years 
was the actual rate outside the range of any of the individual forecasts, for the remaining 
macro-economic forecasters this occurred in at last half of the years. In the case of inflation 
the actual rate of inflation observed was outside the range of individual forecasts in eight 
years. Consistent with some of the previous evidence, it would appear there is to some extent 
greater accuracy, certainly with respect to the dispersion observed in the rent forecasts. In 
only five of the twelve years was the percentage rate of rental growth outside the range of 
individual forecasts provided, less than in all of the macro series with the exception of the rate 
of unemployment.  
Table 1 and Figure 1 do provide some preliminary evidence as to the relative accuracy 
of the different series over time. They do illustrate that in most cases, as would be expected, 
the greatest observed divergence, or inaccuracy, was in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
However, from Figure 1 it is noticeable that in comparison to GDP, Consumer Spending and 
Inflation, the Rent forecasts were more accurate during the immediate worsening of 
conditions in 2008 and 2009. In contrast, property forecasters had their ‘worse’ performing 
year in 2010 when they failed to predict and forecast the bounce back in the market. To 
expand upon these initial findings Table 2 reports the four key measures of forecast accuracy; 
Mean Forecast Error (MFE), Mean Absolute Error (MAE), Mean Square Error (MSE) and the 
Root Mean Square Error (RMSE). Figure 2 graphically compares and contrasts the accuracy 
of the property and macroeconomic forecasts based on their corresponding RMSEs for the 
same target years. Both Table 2 and Figure 2 confirm the previous findings in that the rent 
forecasts displayed the least accuracy in 2010 when they failed to predict the recovery in the 
U.K. market. This was also true with respect to the Unemployment Rate forecasts which 
predicted a continuation in the rise in unemployment, whereas in fact it marginally fell in 
2010. However, for the remaining macro-economic series the year of heightened inaccuracy 
was either 2008 or 2009 when the extent of the economic downturn was under-estimated.  
What is clear, especially when graphically depicted in Figure 2, is that the property 
rent forecasts are relatively less accurate than all of the macro-economic series in the majority 
of years. In 9 out of the 12 years the property forecasts exhibit greater RMSE’s than all of the 
macro-economic ones. The only exceptions are 2007 (inflation), 2009 (GDP and inflation) 
and 2011 (GDP, consumer spending and inflation). In every other case the RMSE’s for the 
rent forecasts are greater. This result does however have to be viewed in light of the caveat 
that the rental data itself is more volatile and sees a greater range of variables. The IPD index 
for rental growth sees actual annual returns across a range of -7.90% to +7.40% over the 
twelve year period. This is a far greater variation than observed with the macro-economic 
series.  
 
4.2: Comparative Performance of Forecasts 
To further consider the accuracy and performance of the forecasters we calculate both 
the correlation between the consensus forecasts and the eventual actual result obtained and 
also use Theil’s U2 statistic to compare the performance against two alternative naive 
forecasts. Table 3 reports the simple correlation coefficients between the one year forecasts 
and the actual outcome. In each case the correlation is statistically significant. The property 
forecasts have a correlation of 0.7417 with the resulting rental growth reported by IPD. 
Whilst lower than the corresponding coefficients for GDP, Consumer Spending and 
Unemployment, all of which are in excess of 0.8, the correlation with respect to rents does 
indicate greater forecast accuracy in comparison to inflation forecasts. This highlights the 
point made earlier concerning first viewing of the forecast accuracy measures. Of the five 
series the inflation forecasts perform the weakest. The correlation with actual RPI is 0.5344 
and this is only marginally significant at a 10% level.  
For the analysis of the naive forecasts we use Theil’s U2 statistic (Theil 1966;1971) 
which can be represented as follows: 
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where, F is the forecast, and Y is the observation. Therefore, the U2 statistic can be 
interpreted as dividing the RMSE of the given forecast by the RMSE of the no-change naive 
forecast. Hence, the statistic provides the basis for comparing alternative forecasts relative to 
a naive forecast. If the Theil’s U2 has a value less than one, then the forecasts are better than 
those obtained by using a naive forecast. If the Theil’s U2 has a value equal to one, then the 
forecasts add nothing. Therefore, the naive estimate is just as effective. If the value is greater 
than one, then the naive forecast can be interpreted as having outperformed the consensus 
forecasts.  
Two alternative naive forecasts are assumed as a basis of comparison. The first naive 
forecast assumes that the following year’s outcome is equal to the current year’s outcome. 
This is effectively a forecast of “same again”. The second naive forecast uses the long-term 
average up to the date of the forecast. For example, for rental growth forecasts made in 2002 
for 2003, the second naive uses the long-term average growth rates of the IPD index up to 
2002. This approach avoids the potential bias from the use of subsequent data that might be 
incorporated into the averages’ figures. The same approach is used with each of the respective 
reference indices or series’. The results are displayed in Table 4 and do in the main provide 
positive evidence as to the ability and accuracy of forecasters in the real estate market. The 
first naive is more accurate than the consensus published forecast in five of the twelve years. 
In the case of the second naive the corresponding figure is six years. Therefore, the 
forecasters outperform the naive in at least half of the target years. Of particular interest is 
that with the exception of the second naive in 2010, all of the years when the naive forecasts 
outperformed and displayed greater accuracy were during the strong market pre-2007. This 
reaffirms our previous comments and findings regarding forecast conservatism often being 
heightened during strong economic conditions. At the time the forecasts actually matter, i.e., 
during the difficult post 2007 period, in the majority of cases the forecasters outperformed. 
These findings also need to be viewed in light of the findings with respect to the 
macro-economic series’. The rent forecasts perform in a comparable manner against their 
naive’s to those for GDP and Consumer Spending. Both of the naive forecasts outperform the 
GDP forecasts in seven of the twelve years whilst for Consumer Spending the forecasts did 
worse in six and five years against the two naive’s respectively. As with the property 
forecasts the majority of the under-performance versus the naive’s came pre-2007. With 
regard to the Inflation and Unemployment Rate forecasts there is a marked difference in 
relative accuracy between the two alternatives. Naive 1, based on the previous year’s actual 
figure performs very well, whilst the second naive, the long-run average, performs noticeably 
poorly. The first naive outperforms in seven and ten years against the forecasts for inflation 
and unemployment. This would indicate that certainly with respect to Unemployment a 
simple forecast based on the previous year’s figures will outperform more elaborate 
estimates. In contrast, figures based on the long-run historical average rarely perform better 
than the professional forecasts, in only two and one years for inflation and unemployment 
respectively. However, given the major structural changes in the last twenty years in both 
inflation and unemployment levels this degree of inaccuracy based on long-term averages is 
hardly that surprising.  
 
5: Interactions between Macroeconomic and Property Forecasts 
The second key issue that this study address’ is the examination of the relationship 
between the property and macroeconomic forecasts. The rationale in this respect is two-fold, 
although both issues are based on the importance of underlying economic conditions on the 
occupier market and therefore rents. In the first instance there will be potentially common 
factors driving both the economic and property variables. Secondly, the explicit use of macro-
economic forecasts in the estimation of forecasts for the real estate sector may mean that 
variation in relative accuracy in the macro-economic forecasts feeds through into those for 
rents. We consider the issue in two ways. The first tests for casual relationships across the 
different forecasts whilst the second considers the impact of variation in the macro-economic 
forecasts on both uncertainty and accuracy in the rent forecasts.  
 
5.1: Granger Causality Tests 
In the case of the Granger Causality tests we adopt a Vector Autoregression Analysis 
(VAR) framework. We assesses the interactions among the rental growth forecasts with the 
corresponding forecasts for GDP, Consumer Spending, Inflation, and Unemployment. All of 
these forecasts are on a quarterly basis for the sample period of 1999 to 2011. This basis 
results in 47 one-year-ahead forecasts. The VAR specification that is used can be written as 
follows: 
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where,       denotes the forecasts for j=1,2,3 property variables. The      are the 
forecasts for the four macroeconomic variables where {  }   
  represents respective macro-
economic series for t-i quarters, and u1t and u2t are white-noise disturbances. The maximum 
lag length i, is determined by the minimisation of the multivariate versions of the information 
criteria such as Akaike (1974) and Schwarz (1978). These criteria can be defined as follows:  
T
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where,  ̂ denotes the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals, T is the number of 
observations, and    is the total number of independent variables in all equations. The 
rationale behind basing the analysis on Granger causality tests (Granger, 1969) is that there 
exists the possibility that when estimating a VAR that includes many lags of the variables, it 
might be difficult to distinguish which sets of variables have significant effects on each 
dependent variable and which do not. The use of Granger causality tests allow a clearer 
analysis of which the macroeconomic forecasts affect the property forecasts and vice versa.   
This analysis uses the quarterly one-year-ahead property and macroeconomic 
forecasts for the period of 1999 to 2011. This sample results in 47 one-year-ahead forecasts. 
The analysis applies the VAR models as seen in Equation (5). The structure of the system 
incorporates feedback because      (property forecasts) and      (macroeconomic forecasts) 
are allowed to affect each other. For instance,          is the contemporaneous effect of a unit 
change in        on      , and        is the effect of a unit change in        on     . The 
determination of the optimal lag length i is achieved by the minimisation of the multivariate 
versions of the Akaike (1974) and Schwarz (1978) criteria as seen in Equations (6) and (7). 
Before applying the VAR methodology, it is important to ensure the stationarity of the 
variables, we therefore use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (1981). The results are 
reported in Table 4 and demonstrate that both the property and macroeconomic one-year-
ahead forecasts are integrated by an order of one. For that reason, these forecasts are included 
in VAR system as first differences. The optimal lag length that minimises the Akaike and 
Schwarz criteria is four quarters before the time of the forecast.  
Table 6 reports the findings from the Granger Causality tests. The findings shows that 
the one-year-ahead forecasts for Inflation and Unemployment significantly affect the rental 
growth forecasts. If one examines the underlying coefficients from the VAR system it can be 
seen that inflation and unemployment are negatively and positively related with the 
corresponding rent forecasts. Inflation is generally a key variable, significantly causing GDP 
and Consumer Spending as well as rental growth. It is also noticeable that there is a 
significant bilateral relationship between the Unemployment Rate and Consumer Spending. 
As would somewhat be expected there isn’t however any evidence of the Rent forecasts 
significantly impacting upon those for the macro-economic series’.  
 
5.3: The Impact of Economic Uncertanity 
The last component of the empirical analysis investigates whether uncertainty in the 
macroeconomic forecasts affects uncertainty in the property forecasts and in turn if this 
uncertainty contributes to heightened inaccuracy in the rent forecasts. We follow recent 
studies in measuring uncertainty through the cross-sectional variance of the forecasts (e.g. 
Giordani & Soderlind 2003; Lahiri & Sheng, 2010a). Based on these annual measures of 
dispersion/disagreement as a proxy for uncertainty we then regress these on a similar measure 
of uncertainty in the rent forecasts. The regressions have the following form: 
    ttt uZVARYVAR          (8) 
where,         denotes the current quarterly cross-sectional variance in property 
forecasts,         is the current quarterly cross-sectional variance in the relevant 
macroeconomic forecast and ut is a white-noise process. These regressions enable us to 
consider whether uncertainty in macroeconomic forecasts at time t affects the dispersion in 
property forecasts at the same time. These regressions based on the quarterly cross-sectional 
variances. We estimate the models twice, once using the contemporaneous proxies of 
uncertainty and once with the independent variables lagged. The optimal lag length in the 
variance of macroeconomic forecasts is determined by the minimisation of the Schwartz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC). The optimal lag is one quarter. 
The results, reported in Table 7 clearly illustrate that the uncertainty in 
macroeconomic forecasts is positively related with the uncertainty in property forecasts. In 
other words, the greater the degree of disagreement across the forecasts of the 
macroeconomic forecasts, the greater the corresponding dispersion in the property forecasts. 
With the exception of Consumer Spending, significant positive coefficients are reported for 
the macro-economic series’, both when contemporaneous and lagged measures are used. 
However, the R
2
 clearly has greater explanatory power from contemporaneous uncertainty 
than from that lagged one-quarter. The results of the regression analysis disclose evidence 
that property forecasters are indeed affected by the current and the previous-quarter economic 
conditions at the time of their forecasts. In other words, increased uncertainty surrounding 
economic conditions, as proxied through the dispersion of the macroeconomic forecasts’ does 
contribute to an increase in the disagreement shown and reported across the rent forecasts.  
This analysis can then be extended to consider whether this increased dispersion in 
macro-economic forecasts also can be related to reduced accuracy in the forecasts of rental 
growth. We adapt Equation (8), and it’s lagged equivalent, by replacing the dependent 
variable with the annual Mean Absolute Error of the rent forecasts. The model has the 
following form: 
    ttt uXVARYMAE          (9) 
where,         denotes the quarterly Mean Absolute Error’s (MAE) for the rent 
forecasts at time t and         is the corresponding cross-sectional variances of both the 
macro-economic as well as the rental forecast. As with the preceding analysis this model is 
also run in a lagged variation. The results of this specification are shown in Table 8 and show 
that with the exceptional of Consumer Spending, significant beta coefficients are reported in 
each case. In addition, the beta coefficients are in each case positively signed, indicating that 
the uncertainty in both the property and macroeconomic forecasts leads to an increase in the 
Mean Absolute Error of the rent forecasts. In other words, the greater the uncertainty in these 
forecasts, the less accurate the forecasts of rental growth are. Thus, property forecasters are 
not only are affected by the current market conditions (uncertainty) at the time of forecasts 
but also in that increased uncertainty leads to reduced forecasting accuracy.   
 
  
 6: Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the characteristics of property and macroeconomic 
forecasts for the one-year-ahead period. The first feature that is examined is the forecasting 
accuracy of these forecasts. The analysis suggests that both property and macroeconomic 
forecasters tend to be conservative in their predictions by exhibiting positive forecast errors 
during the sample period. However, both of the forecasters tend to overestimate when the 
market is underperforming and vice versa. The property forecasters feel more comfortable 
predicting the trend in rents than in capital growth and total returns, a finding that is in line 
with previous studies (Matysiak et. al. 2012).  
Additionally, this research suggests that property forecasters are affected by 
macroeconomic forecasts. Uncertainty in the economy, as measured through dispersion in the 
macroeconomic forecasts, is positively related with uncertainty in the forecasts of rental 
growth. In other words, the greater the uncertainty in macroeconomic forecasts, the greater 
the uncertainty in property forecasts. Finally, the increased uncertainty both in property and 
macroeconomic forecasts lead to the production of more inaccurate property forecasts. 
Evidence is found that the greater the uncertainty (cross-sectional variance) of the forecasts, 
the greater the mean absolute errors of the property forecasts and in turn the smaller their 
accuracy.   
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Performance of the One-Year Forecasts 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 StDv 
Panel A: Rental Growth Forecasts 
Actual  7.40 3.60 -1.20 -2.00 2.10 2.90 4.00 4.70 -1.20 -7.90 -0.50 0.60 3.8244 
Consensus 
Forecast 
4.00 4.50 1.30 0.20 -0.60 2.00 2.40 3.50 2.60 -6.30 -6.10 1.04 3.4036 
Min 2.00 2.60 -2.00 -2.00 -2.10 0.60 0.60 2.60 1.10 -10.80 -12.80 -0.70 
 
Max 6.50 7.10 3.50 2.20 0.70 3.10 3.70 5.00 5.30 -2.10 -1.90 3.60 
 
Range 4.50 4.50 5.50 4.20 2.80 2.50 3.10 2.40 4.20 8.70 10.90 4.30 
 
StDev 1.20 1.30 1.60 1.20 0.90 0.60 0.60 0.50 1.00 2.30 2.30 0.87 
 
JB 2.30 1.50 4.30 1.10 1.90 0.30 6.30a 1.90 6.10a 0.60 6.20a 6.54a 
 
Obs 28 28 25 18 21 27 28 29 29 23 27 27   
Panel B: GDP Forecasts 
Actual  4.36 3.10 2.62 3.46 2.91 2.06 2.57 3.41 -1.11 -4.47 2.07 0.65 2.3333 
Consensus 
Forecast 
2.91 2.68 2.00 2.52 2.63 2.58 2.17 2.43 1.95 -0.95 1.24 1.96 0.9913 
Min 2.10 2.30 1.40 1.60 0.30 0.80 0.20 0.50 -0.10 -2.10 -0.50 0.80 
 
Max 3.80 3.20 2.70 3.10 3.50 3.20 2.90 2.90 2.40 0.30 2.00 3.10 
 
Range 1.70 0.90 1.30 1.50 3.20 2.40 2.70 2.40 2.50 2.40 2.50 2.30 
 
StDev 0.41 0.19 0.35 0.33 0.59 0.44 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.69 0.54 0.50 
 
JB 0.44 2.15 0.27 5.84b 143.26a 152.25a 99.85a 211.01a 182a 0.95 19.46a 1.26 
 
Obs 22 23 24 20 25 27 30 27 24 28 24 26   
Panel C: Consumer Spending Forecasts 
Actual  5.21 3.90 4.16 3.06 2.94 2.11 1.77 2.62 -1.48 -3.60 1.23 -1.22 2.4927 
Consensus 
Forecast 
3.16 2.72 2.66 2.57 2.38 2.27 1.85 2.28 1.75 -1.23 0.23 1.25 1.1819 
Min 2.20 2.20 1.80 1.50 1.60 1.00 0.60 1.30 0.60 -3.47 -1.10 -0.50 
 
Max 4.30 3.60 4.00 3.90 4.20 3.06 2.50 3.40 2.30 0.60 2.00 3.90 
 
Range 2.10 1.40 2.20 2.40 2.60 2.06 1.90 2.10 1.70 4.07 3.10 4.40 
 
StDev 0.54 0.36 0.52 0.55 0.59 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.48 1.06 0.82 0.94 
 
JB 0.18 3.61 0.72 0.92 16.04a 6.26b 2.93 0.32 3.29 0.20 1.18 3.97 
 
Obs 22 22 24 20 25 27 30 27 24 28 24 26   
  
Table 1: Performance of the One-Year Forecasts (continued) 
Panel D: Inflation (RPI) Forecasts 
Actual  2.88 1.80 1.62 2.88 2.92 2.79 3.15 4.18 3.92 -0.53 4.52 5.07 1.4343 
Consensus 
Forecast 
2.26 2.30 2.33 2.32 2.48 2.33 2.27 2.71 2.66 2.51 2.54 3.46 0.3204 
Min 1.60 1.80 1.90 2.00 1.80 1.90 1.40 2.00 2.10 1.01 1.30 3.00 
 
Max 2.70 2.80 3.30 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 3.20 3.40 4.00 4.00 4.14 
 
Range 1.10 1.00 1.40 0.90 1.10 1.00 1.50 1.20 1.30 2.99 2.70 1.14 
 
StDev 0.26 0.25 0.30 0.26 0.23 0.29 0.34 0.28 0.30 0.69 0.68 0.31 
 
JB 1.91 0.22 22.94a 2.83 7.04b 0.72 0.35 1.11 0.49 0.02 1.16 1.42 
 
Obs 22 23 23 20 25 27 26 26 22 25 20 22   
Panel E: Unemployment Rate Forecasts 
Actual  3.60 3.10 3.20 3.09 2.71 2.75 2.90 2.60 2.80 4.60 4.50 4.70 0.7500 
Consensus 
Forecast 
4.11 3.51 3.54 3.25 3.15 2.70 3.00 3.12 2.88 4.04 5.91 4.81 0.8876 
Min 3.60 3.20 2.90 2.80 2.70 2.30 2.60 2.70 2.30 3.20 4.80 4.00 
 
Max 4.50 4.00 4.20 3.80 3.80 3.50 3.50 3.70 3.60 4.80 7.00 5.40 
 
Range 0.90 0.80 1.30 1.00 1.10 1.20 0.90 1.00 1.30 1.60 2.20 1.40 
 
StDev 0.24 0.23 0.33 0.22 0.23 0.28 0.22 0.20 0.29 0.42 0.55 0.33 
 
JB 0.67 1.95 0.43 2.70 4.72c 13.68a 1.33 8.93b 0.87 0.69 0.33 2.57 
 
Obs 22 21 23 20 22 24 26 25 22 24 21 18   
Note: Table  1 displays the actual figures for each of the five series together with descriptive statistics for the Consensus and individual 
forecasts. Each of the forecasts are one-year ahead.  
 
Figure 1: Accuracy of Property and Macroeconomic Forecasts 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
Note: Figure 1 displays the respective property and economic series’ together with the corresponding consensus forecast. 
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 Table 2: Forecasting Accuracy Metrics per year 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Rental Growth 
MFE 3.43 -0.91 -2.55 -2.16 2.64 0.87 1.61 1.22 -3.78 -1.55 5.63 -0.44 
MAE 3.43 1.24 2.73 2.16 2.64 0.91 1.61 1.24 3.78 2.36 5.63 0.73 
MSE 13.13 2.54 8.8 5.99 7.82 1.16 2.96 1.77 15.25 7.6 36.93 0.93 
RMSE 3.62 1.59 2.97 2.45 2.8 1.08 1.72 1.33 3.91 2.76 6.08 0.96 
GDP 
MFE 1.45 0.42 0.62 0.95 0.28 -0.51 0.40 0.98 -3.06 -3.53 0.83 -1.31 
MAE 1.45 0.43 0.63 0.95 0.39 0.61 0.45 0.98 3.06 3.53 0.83 1.31 
MSE 2.27 0.21 0.50 1.01 0.41 0.45 0.40 1.16 9.58 12.89 0.97 1.96 
RMSE 1.51 0.46 0.71 1.00 0.64 0.67 0.63 1.08 3.10 3.59 0.98 1.40 
Consumer 
Spending 
MFE 2.05 1.18 1.49 0.49 0.56 -0.15 -0.08 0.34 -3.24 -2.37 1.00 -2.48 
MAE 2.05 1.18 1.49 0.61 0.71 0.39 0.38 0.44 3.24 2.37 1.09 2.48 
MSE 4.47 1.52 2.49 0.53 0.64 0.23 0.21 0.33 10.69 6.70 1.65 6.98 
RMSE 2.11 1.23 1.58 0.73 0.80 0.48 0.46 0.57 3.27 2.59 1.28 2.64 
Inflation (RPI) 
MFE 0.62 -0.50 -0.72 0.56 0.44 0.46 0.88 1.48 1.25 -3.04 1.98 1.61 
MAE 0.62 0.50 0.72 0.56 0.44 0.48 0.88 1.48 1.25 3.04 1.98 1.61 
MSE 0.45 0.31 0.60 0.38 0.24 0.29 0.89 2.25 1.66 9.71 4.36 2.69 
RMSE 0.67 0.56 0.77 0.61 0.49 0.54 0.94 1.50 1.29 3.12 2.09 1.64 
Unemployment 
Rate 
MFE -0.51 -0.41 -0.34 -0.16 -0.44 0.05 -0.10 -0.52 -0.08 0.56 -1.41 -0.11 
MAE 0.51 0.41 0.39 0.21 0.44 0.21 0.18 0.52 0.22 0.58 1.41 0.26 
MSE 0.32 0.22 0.22 0.07 0.24 0.08 0.06 0.30 0.09 0.49 2.27 0.11 
RMSE 0.57 0.47 0.47 0.26 0.49 0.28 0.24 0.55 0.30 0.70 1.51 0.34 
Note: MFE, MAE, MSE and RMSE are the Mean Forecast Error, Mean Absolute Error, Mean Squared Error and the Root Mean Squared Error respectively. Figures in bold indicate the year of 
highest forecast errors for rent and macro-economic forecasts. 
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Figure 2: Comparison of the Root Mean Square Error 
Note: Figure 2 displays the Root Mean Squared Error for each target year, based on one-year ahead forecasts, for each of the 
series. 
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Table 3: Correlation between One Year Forecast and Actual 
Series Correlation 
Rental Growth 
0.7417*** 
{3.4972} 
GDP 
0.8731*** 
{5.6628} 
Consumer Spending 
0.8450*** 
{4.9962} 
Inflation (RPI) 
0.5344* 
{1.9993} 
Unemployment Rate 
0.8663*** 
{5.4849} 
Note: Table 3 displays the correlation between the one year ahead forecast and 
the resulting actual figure obtained for each of the five series’. The figures in 
parentheses are the t-statistics. *** indicates 1% significance, ** 5% and * 1%. 
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Table 4: Theil’s U2 Statistics for Naive Forecasts 
Date of 
Forecast 
Target Year Rental Growth GDP Consumer 
Spending 
Inflation (RPI) Unemployment 
Rate 
Panel A: Naive 
1 
      
1999 2000 1.95 1.96 16.51 0.50 1.13 
2000 2001 0.42 0.37 0.94 0.52 0.94 
2001 2002 0.62 1.48 6.19 4.18 4.70 
2002 2003 3.33 1.19 0.66 0.49 2.41 
2003 2004 0.69 1.16 6.82 11.47 1.29 
2004 2005 1.34 0.79 0.58 4.18 6.88 
2005 2006 1.47 1.24 1.35 2.63 1.61 
2006 2007 1.91 1.29 0.67 1.45 1.83 
2007 2008 0.66 0.69 0.80 4.85 1.48 
2008 2009 0.42 1.07 1.22 0.70 0.39 
2009 2010 0.82 0.15 0.27 0.41 15.07 
2010 2011 0.90 0.99 1.08 3.00 1.68 
No. of Years Naive More Accurate 
than Consensus 
5 7 6 7 10 
Panel B: Naive 
2 
      
1999 2000 1.35 0.74 0.86 0.17 0.16 
2000 2001 1.33 0.64 1.18 0.12 0.12 
2001 2002 0.48 4.41 1.30 0.16 0.13 
2002 2003 0.36 1.03 9.05 0.18 0.07 
2003 2004 1.12 1.52 9.92 0.16 0.12 
2004 2005 0.77 1.45 0.53 0.17 0.07 
2005 2006 12.41 18.52 0.37 0.35 0.07 
2006 2007 2.19 1.22 1.52 0.96 0.15 
2007 2008 0.73 0.85 0.74 0.73 0.09 
2008 2009 0.23 0.51 0.40 0.51 0.47 
2009 2010 1.38 2.65 0.81 1.99 1.02 
2010 2011 0.33 0.88 0.69 5.05 0.27 
No. of Years Naive More Accurate 
than Consensus 
6 7 5 2 1 
Note: Naive 1 approach indicates the previous year growth-rate for the respective series, or in the case of unemployment the 
previous year’s percentage unemployment rate. Naive 2 is the long-term average of the actual values of the different series 
up to the date of forecasts. Figures less than unity indicate that the consensus forecast was more accurate than the respective 
naive. Figures greater than unity imply that the naive outperformed.  
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Table 5: Stationarity Tests 
 Levels Differences 
Rental Growth -2.55 -3.66*** 
GDP -2.12 -7.88*** 
Consumer Spending -1.53 -7.08*** 
Inflation (RPI) -2.49 -4.40*** 
Unemployment Rate -2.37 -4.52*** 
Note: Table 5 reports Augmented Dickey Fuller tests for stationarity. *** denote rejection of the null at the 1% level  
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Table 6: Granger Causality Tests 
 Rental 
Growth 
GDP Consumer 
Spending 
Inflation 
(RPI) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Rental Growth  3.53 5.71 6.08 4.56 
GDP 3.66  2.30 1.28 12.12
b
 
Consumer Spending 1.59 0.68  4.92 11.96
b
 
Inflation (RPI) 8.85
c
 20.43
a
 20.47
b
  6.25 
Unemployment Rate 15.30
a
 5.36 9.50
b
 1.16  
Note: Table 6 presents χ2 statistics for the pairwise Granger causality tests between the one-year-ahead rental growth 
(RG)and the corresponding one-year ahead macroeconomic forecasts for the gross domestic product (GDP), consumer 
spending (CS), retail price index (RPI), and unemployment rate (UR). The null hypothesis means that the column variables 
do not Granger-cause raw variables, and the a, b, and c, denote rejection of the null at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. The Granger causality tests are estimated with a lag of four quarters. The optimal lag length is chosen by 
the minimisation of the Akaike and Schwartz criterion. 
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Table 7: Impact of Macroeconomic Forecasts on Rental Forecast Uncertainty 
 I II III IV 
Panel A: Contemporaneous Macroeconomic Forecasts 
Constant -0.05 
(0.78) 
0.26 
(0.65) 
0.31 
(0.24) 
0.67*** 
(0.21) 
GDP 5.26* 
(2.94) 
   
Consumer Spending 
 
2.76 
(1.89) 
  
Inflation (RPI)   7.50*** 
(1.65) 
 
Unemployment Rate    4.42*** 
(0.22) 
R
2
 0.26 0.22 0.60 0.67 
Panel B: Lagged Macroeconomic Forecasts 
Constant -0.21 
(0.76) 
0.34 
(0.54) 
0.35 
(0.28) 
0.93*** 
(0.31) 
GDP 5.71** 
(2.78) 
  
 
Consumer Spending  2.61 
(1.68) 
 
 
Inflation (RPI)   7.15*** 
(2.34) 
 
Unemployment Rate    3.09*** 
(0.69) 
R
2
 0.30 0.21 0.53 0.33 
Note: Table 7 is based upon versions of Equation (8) where the dependent variable is the cross-sectional variance of the 
individual forecasts of rental growth. The explanatory variables are the cross-sectional variances of the respective macro-
economic forecasts. The figures in parantheses are t-statistics. * indicates significance at a 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 
1%.  
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Table 8: Impact of Macroeconomic Forecasts on Rental Forecast Accuracy 
 I II III IV V 
Panel A: Contemporaneous Macroeconomic Forecasts 
Constant 0.94 
(0.85) 
2.27*** 
(0.75) 
2.14*** 
(0.47) 
2.34*** 
(0.44) 
1.97*** 
(0.44) 
GDP 6.95*** 
(2.50)    
 
Consumer Spending 
 
1.77 
(1.79)   
 
Inflation (RPI)   5.76** 
(2.39) 
  
Unemployment Rate    3.75*** 
(0.40) 
 
Rental Growth    
 
0.72*** 
(0.10) 
R
2
 0.29 0.06 0.22 0.31 0.33 
Panel B: Lagged Macroeconomic Forecasts 
Constant 1.25 
(0.93) 
2.20*** 
(0.79) 
2.28*** 
(0.55) 
2.43*** 
(0.47) 
2.07*** 
(0.48) 
GDP 5.82** 
(2.73)    
 
Consumer Spending 
 
1.85 
(1.78)   
 
Inflation (RPI)   4.67 
(3.24) 
  
Unemployment Rate    3.12*** 
(0.62) 
 
Rental Growth    
 
0.63*** 
(0.20) 
R
2
 0.20 0.06 0.14 0.21 0.26 
Note: Table 8 is based upon versions of Equation (9) where the dependent variable is the Mean Absolute Error of the 
rent forecasts. The explanatory variables are the cross-sectional variances of the respective macro-economic forecasts and 
rental growth. The figures in parantheses are t-statistics. * indicates significance at a 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
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Endnotes: 
                                                        
i
 A small selection of this literature includes; Brounen & Jennen (2009); D’Arcy et al. (1997); De Wit 
& van Dijk (2003); Englund et al. (2008); Ibanez & Pennington-Cross (2013); Hendershott (1996); 
Hendershott et al., (1999, 2002a, 2002b, 2010); Rosen (1984); Shilling et al., (1987); Wheaton (1987); 
Wheaton & Torto (1988, 1994); Wheaton et al. (1997). 
ii
 See for example, papers such as Chaplin (1999); Brooks & Tsolacos (1999, 2000); Stevenson & 
McGrath (2003); Krystalogianni et al. (2004); Matysiak & Tsolacos (2003). 
iii
 There is a related literature that has considered equity analysts, frequently observing similar 
behavioural effects. See for example, Barber et al. (2007); Clarke & Subramanian (2006); Clarke et al. 
(2006), Clement et al. (2011); Cooper et al. (2001); Cowen et al. (2006); Dechow et al. (2000); Hong 
& Kubik (2003); Jung et al. (2012); Kim et al. (2011); Welch (2000). 
iv
 It does however, need to be noted that a further possible factor behind the reduced variability is an 
averaging effect. An element of smoothing may be introduced into the consensus forecast due to it 
being estimated as the simple average of the individual forecasts. 
